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Toward a "Standpoint" on the "History of Consciousness": The Influence of Beck and Fichte on Hegel's Conception of the Task of the *Phenomenology*

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Introduction

The self-ascribed task of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is "the *education* [*Bildung*] of consciousness up to the standpoint of science" (PS ¶78).[1] In this paper, I would like to situate this task historically within the context of a certain tradition of interpreting Kant's transcendental idealism. This tradition owes its basic character to Jakob Sigismund Beck's *Standpunktslehre* (1793-1796) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte's early *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794-1795). Beck's original reading of Kant's first *Critique* illuminates the background of Hegel's intention to lead us up to the "standpoint" of philosophical science (i.e., speculative philosophy), while Fichte's endorsement of Beck's approach within the development of the *Wissenschaftslehre* should help us to the essentials of why an "education of consciousness" is required in order to adopt the standpoint of speculative philosophy.

One of the essential aspects of the *Phenomenology* that is sure to trouble the reader is Hegel's contention that the work must begin by presupposing the basic way in which our "natural consciousness" (PS ¶¶33, 77, 78, 79, *inter alia*) conceives of "truth", which designates the way in which things are in themselves, as something external to "knowledge", which designates the way things appear to be to us, and which is thus more accurately described as "phenomenal" or "apparent" knowledge (*erscheinende Wissen*; PS ¶82). This phenomenal knowledge (the conception of knowledge implicit in natural consciousness) is the object under investigation in the *Phenomenology* (ibid.). Hegel does not justify either the description he offers of natural consciousness nor his designation of phenomenal knowledge as the object of study, but simply contents himself with claiming that these determinations are "at first taken up" — that is, in the *Phenomenology* — "as they immediately present themselves" and that the way they were described "is indeed the way that they present themselves" (ibid.). This gives rise to a host of questions about the accuracy of Hegel's descriptions, and whether our natural consciousness does in fact present itself to us immediately in the manner described. These are, however, all derivative questions, for underlying them is a fundamental issue that needs to be settled first: how does Hegel allow himself at all to claim that the standpoint of speculative philosophy can be reached by first taking up the basic framework of natural consciousness, the accuracy of his initial description or lack thereof notwithstanding?

[1] Being led up to the "standpoint" of speculative philosophy remained an abiding concern for Hegel, even when he does not reference the *Phenomenology* explicitly, as we can see from his description of the task of the "Three Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity" in the *Encyclopedia Logic* (which Hegel revised repeatedly up to the last edition which came out one year before his death, in 1830): "to clarify the meaning of the Logic and to lead into the standpoint that is here given to it" (EL §25).

This question deserves at least to be illuminated by a plausible account, if not an adequate answer, for a serious study of the work to take place, since it bears a major hallmark of an illicit starting point; it looks like an arbitrary assumption, an unjustified assertion.[2] I hope that my efforts here will be seen as a contribution toward shedding some light on this question by outlining how Hegel may be placed within the interpretive tradition mentioned above.

I. Kant's Distinction of Transcendental Idealism from Material Idealism

One influential way in which Kant's contribution to philosophy was assessed by his contemporaries was by honing in on how he distinguishes his transcendental idealism from different varieties of "material idealism"[3], which either cast doubt on or deny the independent existence of the objects around us. The urgency of distinguishing his position from material idealism became clear to Kant after the reviews of the first edition of the first *Critique*. According to Kant, one of the chief ways in which his project was misunderstood was when it was construed as an idealism of the Berkeleyan kind; an idealism, that is, which denied the existence of things outside our perception of them. We see this concern taken up primarily in two places: the "Refutation of Idealism", which was inserted into the second edition of the *Critique*, and in various places of the *Prolegomena*, which was published in 1783 following the first edition (1781) of the *Critique*, partially — like the "Refutation of Idealism" — in response to misunderstandings about the nature of transcendental idealism from Kant's readership. The gist of Kant's claim about the philosophical function of transcendental idealism may be gleaned from statements like the following:

> … what I called idealism did not concern the existence of things…, for it never came into my mind to doubt that, but only the sensory representation of things, to which space and time above all belong; and about these last, hence in general about all *appearance*, I have only shown: that they are not things (but mere ways of representing), nor are they determinations that belong to things in themselves. The word

[2] I believe that doing away with this question by soliciting an agreement to pursue the thousands of pages of Hegel's system, at the end of which all will supposedly become clear, belongs to the field of philosophical apologetics, and does not qualify as an acceptable explanation.

[3] Kant is concerned with responding to "material idealism", which either doubts or denies "the existence of objects in space outside us" (B 274). If material idealism only doubts the existence of external objects, it is called "problematic idealism". A main representative of problematic idealism, according to Kant, is Descartes, "who declares only one empirical assertion ..., namely, **I am**, to be indubitable" (ibid.). But this problematic idealism is strictly unobjectionable, since it "does not assert anything", and amounts simply to "allowing ... no decisive judgment until a sufficient proof has been found" (B 274-5). The rest of the "Refutation of Idealism" attempts to supply the requisite proof. -- If, on the other hand, material idealism denies the existence of external objects, it is called "dogmatic idealism". The representative of this position is Berkeley, "who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary" (B 274). Kant claims that the Transcendental Aesthetic took care of the claims of dogmatic idealism (ibid.).

> transcendental, however, which with me never signifies a relation of our cognition to a thing, but only to the *faculty of cognition*, was intended to prevent this misinterpretation. (P §13 Note III)

This must have been received as somewhat mystifying: what kind of philosophy is this which, on one hand, grants the independent existence of things, and on the other, tells us that we have no access to things as they are in themselves? In response to such bewilderment, Jakob Sigismund Beck developed his "*Standpunktslehre*", the "standpoint doctrine", whose purpose was to outline the only correct interpretive strategy to adopt in order to comprehend the uniqueness of the philosophical program inaugurated by Kant's "critical philosophy". This purpose is encapsulated in the title of the volume bearing the bulk of the doctrine: *The Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy Must Be Judged* (1796).[4]

Though relatively well known (Nitzan 10-13), Beck seems to have remained a philosopher's philosopher. He was well respected by Kant, who was his teacher in the early 1780's and who personally recommended Beck to his publisher in order to write a commentary on Kant's philosophy (Nitzan 10). Indeed, Kant held Beck in such high esteem that he "was willing to go along with many of Beck's suggestions as to how the material of the *Critique* could be re-arranged to make it more accessible to the public, and even allowed that the Transcendental Aesthetic should come after the Transcendental Analytic" (di Giovanni 40).[5] We also find in Fichte's writing much uncharacteristic praise for him.[6] As I will suggest shortly, it seems that he had an influence on Fichte's

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[4] While one observes a dearth of articles on Beck in English, there have been two extensive book-length studies of his work. The recently published study by Nitzan (2014) situates Beck specifically with regard to the question of the thing-in-itself, and thus attempts to serve as a systematic introduction to Beck as a philosopher on his own account, and not simply as a commentator on Kant. It also has the merit of contrasting Beck in detail to Fichte and Reinhold; an issue which does not concern us in our investigation. The older, colossal study by Wallner (900+ pages) investigates the affinities between Beck's understanding of Kant and the development of phenomenology, particularly through Husserl. (Both works are referenced in the Bibliography.)

[5] Nonetheless, at the end of the day, Kant was as dissatisfied with Beck's take on transcendental idealism as he was with Fichte's. We see this in Kant's famous "open letter" to Fichte, published in 1799 in reaction to the *Atheismusstreit* (the atheism dispute): "[To those who maintain] that the *Critique* is not to be taken *literally* in what it says about sensibility, and that anyone who wants to understand the *Critique* must first master the requisite *standpoint* (of Beck or of Fichte), because *Kant's* precise words, like Aristotle's, will destroy the spirit, I therefore declare again that the *Critique* is to be understood by considering exactly what it says and that it requires only the common standpoint that any mind sufficiently cultivated in such abstract investigations will bring to it" (C 560).

[6] For instance: "Though I find in [Beck's] view the weaknesses objected to above" -- and which will be discussed briefly in this paper -- "that should not deter me from the public expression of due respect to the man who, on his own account, has raised himself out of the confusion of our age to the insight that the philosophy of Kant is not a dogmatism but a transcendental idealism" (WL 24 *n.*3).

elaboration of his *Wissenschaftslehre*, the *Science of Knowledge*;[7] a decisive influence that I believe is significant for understanding the questions posed above regarding Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

II. "The Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy is to be Judged"

We should say a word about Beck's general philosophical orientation. Philosophy, according to Beck, has been led astray in its search for first principles.[8] Specifically, it has been led astray by a fundamental misunderstanding of the kind of cognitive representation that a principle can provide. Beck reminds us that a principle is, first and foremost, a proposition. A proposition adopts the title of "principle" when it sets out to present us with "a cognition that grounds certain other cognitions", and of "highest" or "first" principle when it acts as a self-grounding cognition which grounds all other cognitions (OPS 210). However, Beck goes on to argue that since a first principle is a proposition before all else, it can merely "appeal" to a fact, however indubitable or self-evident, but cannot "exhibit" that fact itself:

> This is precisely the point that was overlooked in the past — as far as I can see — and this failure led to the mistake of searching for first principles in philosophy. Certain propositions were called first principles; and in order to authenticate them, appeal was made to facts. (OPS 233)

For Beck, the actuality of self-evidence or indubitability itself must be exhibited, being the source of the significance of any suggested first principle. As such, the truth of a first principle can at best only be conditional. This is not due to a defect in any particular principle, but has to do rather with what Beck saw as the basic nature of propositions and their constituent discursive concepts.

Accordingly, Beck maintains that the chief mistake which led to all the misunderstandings that bothered Kant was taking Kant's demonstration of the various transcendental employments of the understanding as standing for first principles and, specifically, putting the Kantian categories on par with other discursive concepts. Instead, Beck suggests that the *Critique's* articulation of the transcendental functions of understanding in judgment, that is, of the transcendental categories, is meant to exhibit that fact to which all propositions actually do appeal:

> The 'fact', however, is the employment of the understanding itself; it is precisely the principle that the *Critique* lays down as the highest — not in the role of highest proposition in an argument, in order to be able to derive from it other propositions contained in it, but as the original representing

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[7] Though Fichte would have been reluctant to admit this, since he claims that Beck's work on "the standpoint" has "appeared after the Science of Knowledge" (WL 53). But see footnote 12 below.

[8] This tendency has been continued up to Beck's time, as one of Kant's most influential commentators at the time, Reinhold, sought to ground Kant's project on "the proposition of consciousness".

itself to which every concept must be reduced if it is to have any sense at all. (OPS 236)[9]

This is not the place to go further into Beck's distinction between original representing and derivative representation. We are only interested in the conception of the philosophical task of transcendental idealism implicit in the foregoing insight. One such implication is that what we have at stake are two incommensurate, but complementary, sequences of explanation. Original representing can only be grasped by the reader's transposing herself to its standpoint, something that can only be accomplished by adhering to the postulate: "Represent to yourself an object originally" (OPS 212),[10] which is supposed to correspond in philosophy to the postulate of representing space to oneself in Euclidean geometry. We naturally cannot go further and elaborate on the very important role played by the Euclidean method in post-Kantian philosophy, notably in the early Fichte and Schelling.[11] We must instead content ourselves simply with citing Beck's distinction between a postulate and a proposition, namely, that while a proposition is "the representation of a thing through a concept" (OPS 229), no "thing" is supposed to be represented "through" a concept in a postulate (OPS 225); if anything, what is supposed to be "represented" is the very activity of representing, the register of which the reader must manage to cognitively inhabit for herself.

However, in attempting to transpose ourselves into the standpoint of original representing, we are not meant to be on the verge of denying the reality of experience as it relates to our natural consciousness. On the contrary, it is precisely by seeing things from the standpoint of original representing that we can account for the necessity of experiencing the empirical world the way we do. Nonetheless, with Beck we begin to find ourselves confronted by two qualitatively different sequences of explanation: the empirical one belonging to natural consciousness, and the ideal one belonging to the transcendental standpoint of original representing. Beck's thesis is that all the transcendental doctrines of the *Critique* belong strictly to the latter sequence.

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[9] And further: "This science will not aim at definitions, or the unfolding of concepts; or at drawing up lists of determinations which we attribute to objects when we think of them; for in all of this the actual fact of thinking is not taken into consideration at all. Its aim will be rather to present the *original generation* of concepts. *Original representing* will be the object of this science. This in fact is *transcendental philosophy*. No philosopher before *Kant* ever attained to its idea…" (OPS 219).

[10] "Before everything else we must note that the highest principle of philosophy must not have any other form whatever than that of a postulate. Its sense actually consists in our 'willingness' to transpose [*versetzen*; cf. *setzen*, to posit; a term of which Fichte was quite fond] ourselves into the very original mode of representing. ... To the question, 'What does it mean to represent something to oneself?' I give no answer, for the right answer is the original representing itself. I can do no more than indicate to the reader the mode of operation in which he has to involve himself on his own in order to capture the spirit of the postulate" (OPS 212).

[11] Those interested may consult Daniel Breazeale's forthcoming work, *Men at Work: Philosophical Construction in Fichte and Schelling*, and David Wood's book, *"Mathesis of the Mind"* (both referenced in the Bibliography). Hegel, for his part, rejected the viability of geometrical postulating and the Euclidean method of demonstration for philosophy (PS ¶¶42-47).

By adopting this strategy in reading the *Critique*, Beck saw himself as foreclosing all possible opportunities for misunderstanding Kant's transcendental idealism as casting doubt on the convictions of natural consciousness, and offers his approach as the only possible "standpoint from which the *Critique* is to be judged" (OPS 230):

> Critical idealism … is entirely in agreement with common sense. Just like common sense it declares that the objects affect us and generate sensations in us. But it secures the rightful claims of common sense by deriving the original representing done in the category … from the very employment of the understanding…. (OPS 230)

III. Fichte's Program for a "History of Consciousness"

Fichte pursues a line similar to Beck's in his reading of Kant. This is not the place to articulate the relationship between Beck and Fichte,[12] but only to bring into view the ways in which Fichte may be seen to have gone a step beyond Beck's *Standpunktslehre* and gave the project of adopting the appropriate speculative standpoint a more systematic form,[13] and how that, in turn, may lend us a better understanding of the project of the

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[12] The relationship between Fichte and Beck deserves a study on its own, particularly with regard to the conscious influence (or lack thereof) of Beck on the "Two Introductions to the *Wissenschaftslehre*". I say this for the following reason. In 1796, Beck published the third volume of his impractically titled *Explanatory Abstract of the Critical Writings of Professor Kant, Prepared in Consultation with the Same*, with the subtitle *The Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy Must be Judged* (the work we have been drawing from in this paper). The first volume, already articulating a "standpoint" approach to the reading of the *Critique* had been published in 1793. Fichte, meanwhile, has been laboring on his *Wissenschaftslehre* — a task that will consume his entire life, and which will arrive at no conclusion to the satisfaction of its author. In 1793, the first blossom in the rather thorny history of the *Wissenschaftslehre* appears as the essay, "Concerning the Concept of the *Wissenschaftslehre*". In 1794 Fichte completes and publishes the bulk of his *Foundations of the Entire* Wissenschaftslehre (from which we quote in this paper). The *Foundations* did not include talk of standpoints in the form in which it appeared in 1794. In 1797, the famous "Two Introductions to the *Wissenschaftslehre*" are appended to the *Foundations*, in which we find not only high praise for Beck, but also Fichte's adopting the vocabulary of standpoints. Naturally, we also find criticism of Beck in the "Two Introductions". The engagement with Beck might be explained in part by Beck's review of Fichte's 1793 and 1794 works, which accused Fichte of foundationalism and attempting to develop first principles out of the mere analysis of concepts, without inquiring as to the original activity of representation that makes concepts possible to begin with (for more, cf. Nitzan 87-9). Beck, in fact, bluntly thought that the project of the *Wissenschaftslehre* was a joke (OPS 246 *n.*4), something of which Fichte was already well aware when he was writing the 1795 Preface to the *Foundations*, and to which he responded in kind: "The Halle reviewer [viz., Beck] gives it as his opinion that I have been writing merely in jest; the other judges ... appear to have taken a similar view; so lightly do they treat the matter, and so facetious are their objections, as though it was their duty to answer one joke with another" (WL 91-2). -- This complex history deserves to be the subject of a dedicated study.

[13] I am not making the absurd argument that Fichte was a follower of Beck. It seems to stand to reason, however, that Fichte's conception of the philosopher's standpoint in the "Second Introduction", which I will outline presently, owes much to Beck's.

Phenomenology discussed in the introduction above.

Fichte, who seldom offers a word of praise for any contemporary who is not Kant, offers Beck's *Standpunktslehre* as the best introduction to his *Wissenschaftslehre* (WL 24 *n.*3).[14] Fichte articulates the task of the *Wissenschaftslehre* as answering the question: "Whence arises the system of presentations accompanied by the feeling of necessity? or: How do we come to attribute objective validity to what in fact is only subjective? or, since objective validity is described as existence: How do we come to believe in an existent?" (WL 31). Here, the "us" in question is the "us" of natural consciousness. Thus, the *Science of Knowledge* must work in tandem with "two very different sequences of mental acts: that of the self, which the philosopher observes, and that of the philosopher's observations" (WL 30). Already we observe the contrast, which Beck singles out and develops from Kant, between the philosophical standpoint and ordinary consciousness.

Fichte urges his readers to keep this distinction in mind, for "[a] major source of misunderstanding, and many irrelevant objections to the Science of Knowledge arise from either not distinguishing these two series at all, or confounding what belongs to the one with what belongs to the other" (ibid.), and such misreadings are often the result of the readers' adopting "only one sequence in their philosophy" (ibid.).

The functions of these two "sequences" cannot intersect, for the sequence of "the self" is a lived mode of thought, while philosophy ("idealism" for Fichte) is an explanatory point of view. A long footnote drives the point home:

> It would be owing to a … confusion of the two sequences of thought …, were anyone to think it possible to have an equally basic and consistent *realist* system, *alongside* and *extraneous to* idealism. The realism that overtakes us all, and even the most hardened idealist, when it comes to acting — that is, the assumption that things exist outside and quite independently of us — is itself rooted in idealism and is explained and deduced thereby…. — The philosopher says only in *his own* name: Everything that exists for the self, exists through the self. The self, however, itself says in its own philosophy: As surely as I am and live, something exists outside me, which is not there by my doing. How it [viz., the self] arrives at such a claim, the philosopher explains by the principles of his philosophy. The first standpoint is that of pure speculation; the second, that of life and scientific knowledge [i.e., the empirical sciences]…. The second is only intelligible on the basis of the first…: yet the first standpoint, again, exists only for the purpose of making the second intelligible. Idealism can never be a *mode of thought*, it is merely a

[14] But despite its merits, Fichte saw that Beck has been led away from his praiseworthy insight into "an extravagant form of transcendental idealism" by his neglecting of the "original feeling" which signals forth the activity of the ego (WL 61; cf. Nitzan 196ff.). With that Fichte charges Beck with losing touch of the lived reality of our natural consciousness, as the latter's doctrine becomes unable to "account for the merely sensible predicates of objects" (ibid.). Soon, Fichte will transform this "original feeling" into the famous external "check" on the activity of the ego (WL 189ff.), but this is irrelevant to our investigation, as it is not the point of view Hegel takes up in the beginning of (or really anywhere in) the *Phenomenology*.

speculative point of view. (WL 31 *n.*1)

The point of the passage above is that philosophy works to make intelligible what cannot become intelligible within the epistemological framework of ordinary consciousness, not to nullify or replace it. This is as clear a statement as possible that Fichte, like Beck, is working within the context of a "standpoint" conception of the task of philosophy.

The really transformative move Fichte achieves in his reading of Kant, however, is his development of a program for a "history of consciousness". The idea of a history of consciousness makes its first appearance in the *Wissenschaftslehre* as the natural consequence of adopting the "two sequence" strategy toward philosophical explanation, for it necessitates that the first task is to provide a genetic account of the speculative standpoint starting from the ordinary mode of consciousness. Though the idea does not figure by name in Fichte's early work, its elements are already to be found articulated as the "pragmatic history of the human mind" mentioned in the 1794 *Wissenschaftslehere* (WL 198-9), whereby "pragmatic" is synonymous in this context with "genetic".[15]

Considerations of space do not permit me to give a rigorous outline of how such a history must be written. Suffice it to say that this history is carried out by means of observing the states of the empirical self and grounding them in original operations of representing that are accessible only from the standpoint of a transcendental ego. Unlike Beck, Fichte does not content himself with simply postulating the original operation of representing, and maintains that "we are not allowed … simply to postulate something as a fact, but have to offer proof *that* it is a fact" (ibid.). What is required further, Fichte argues, is to exhibit the standpoint as *derived* from natural consciousness.

Fichte, like Beck, on the other hand, endorses the insight commonly encountered in post-Kantian philosophy, to the effect that "[a]ppeal to facts lying within the scope of ordinary consciousness … produces nothing … save a deceptive popular philosophy, which is no philosophy at all" (WL 197). However, he adds that "if the facts alleged lie beyond this compass" — that is, if the facts alleged are not accessible from the framework of natural consciousness — "then we certainly need to know how the conviction was arrived at, that they are indeed present as facts; and we certainly need to

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[15] This is only a terminological issue. Günter Zöller states that "the post-Kantian project of a reconstructive 'history of consciousness' [was] pioneered by Fichte himself in the final part of the *Foundations for the Entire Wissenschaftslehre*" (114). The original formulation is as follows: "The Science of Knowledge is to be a pragmatic history of the human mind" (WL 198-9). Daniel Breazeale enlighteningly cites Fichte's own clarification, from Fichte's notes, of the terminology used in that formulation: "'pragmatic' = how it comes into being. 'History' is fiction, indicates the genetic manner of the presentation [*pragmatisch wie es zu Stande kommt. -- Geschichte, ist Fiktion, giebt den genetischen Gang des Vortrags*]" (14 n.34). Thus what is at stake here is a genetic history. The project *is* described as "the history of consciousness as it comes to be [*die Geschichte des entstehenden Bewußtseins*]" (ibid.) in one of the two versions of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo*, written between 1798 and 1799. It seems to have become a somewhat standardized term with which to describe Fichte's proposed genetic account by the time Schelling uses it in his 1800 *System of Transcendental Idealism*: "philosophy can enumerate only those actions which constitute epochs, as it were, in the history of self-consciousness, and establish them in their interrelation with one another" (STI 50).

be able to impart this conviction, and such imparting of conviction is assuredly proof *that* the facts in question are facts" (ibid.). It is the task of a "history of consciousness" to supply such a proof of the fact that is accessible only from a speculative "standpoint".

IV. Conclusion: the Standpoint from Which to Judge Why the *Phenomenology* Begins with Natural Consciousness

In this presentation, I have attempted to trace Hegel's description of the task of the *Phenomenology* as "the education of consciousness up to the standpoint of science" back to two moments in the history of post-Kantian philosophy, namely, to Beck's articulation of his standpoint doctrine and Fichte's argument that a history of consciousness must act as the requisite proof for the viability of the speculative standpoint.

Now, Hegel certainly does not follow Fichte in claiming that the "*primordial fact occurring in our mind*" is represented by the principle that "the self posits itself as determined by the not-self" (WL 196). Indeed, Hegel takes care not to postulate at all (PS ¶¶42-47). Nonetheless, it is instructive to see him as working within the same program as that initiated by Beck and laid out by Fichte.

In particular, what must be kept in mind when taking stock of the influence of Beck and Fichte on the procedure of the *Phenomenology* is that the "given" of philosophy is, at first, the conception of truth implicit in natural consciousness, that is, the conception of truth at play in "phenomenal knowledge". This is not a mode of thought that we may or may not choose, but one in which we invariably find ourselves. Hegel himself seems to claim as much, but we do not understand what might have persuaded him to adopt such a position unless we consult the rich interpretive history preceding him in Beck and Fichte. In viewing Hegel's position from that perspective, we begin to understand that the conception of truth implicit in phenomenal knowledge is the essential presupposition of the "realism that overtakes us all" in our ordinary goings about in the world. And the reason why this conception does not constitute an arbitrarily chosen starting point is that this realism is not something to be escaped, but preserved and explained (one is tempted to say, "sublated"). I hope that I have been persuasive in showing that in order to come to a better understanding of why this and no other is the starting point for the philosophical project of the *Phenomenology*, we must look past or, better yet, behind Hegel's words into the deep Kantian roots embedded in Beck's and Fichte's endorsement of a "standpoint" approach toward Kant's philosophy.

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